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DEBORAH JONES MERRrir*
The papers in this Symposium combine a wide variety of legal and social
science perspectives. Does this mix of law and social science illuminate the debate
over affirmative action in higher education? Can the findings of social scientists
inform legal principles in this contentious field? In particular, if the Supreme Court
revisits its holding in Regents of the University of California v. Bakke,' will the
Justices consider social science evidence in weighing the constitutionality of
university affirmative action plans?
Four signs suggest that social science will play some role in determining the
constitutionality of affirmative action in university admissions. The first of these
is history. For almost a century, the Supreme Court has shown a surprising
tendency to weigh social science in pivotal discrimination cases. The Court first
invoked social science data in a 1908 decision, Muller v. Oregon.2 The
complainant in that case challenged an Oregon law limiting the work day for
women employed in factories and laundries. He argued, in part, that the law
unfairly distinguished between male and female employees.
The law's defenders, progressive reformers who hoped to alleviate oppressive
working conditions for both male and female laborers, hired Louis Brandeis to
defend the statute.3 Brandeis submitted his now famous "Brandeis brief'
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1438 U.S. 265 (1978).
2 208 U.S. 412 (1908). For discussion of Muller as the Court's first use of social science
data, see, for example, JOHN MONAHAN & LAURENSWAimER, SociAL ScIENcE iN LAw: CASES
AND MATERLs 5-11 (3d ed. 1994).
3 Many progressives perceived a conflict between the protective legislation challenged in
Muller and the growing movement to obtain suffrage and full equality for women. At the time,
however, many reformers supported the Oregon law as a way both of remedying particularly
onerous working conditions for women and of laying a foundation for protective legislation that
would shield all adult workers. See, e.g., MONAHAN & WALKER, supra note 2, at 8; Ronald
K.L. Collins & Jennifer Friesen, Looking Back on Muller v. Oregon, 69 A.B.A. J. 294, 295
(1983) (part one).
During the decades after Muller, protective legislation may have hurt women more often
than it helped them. See, e.g., Jennifer Friesen & Ronald K.L. Colins, Looking Back on Muller
v. Oregon, 69 A.B.A. J. 472, 474-77 (1983) (part two) (commenting that "protective labor laws
prevented women from taking work in a variety of job callings"); Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Some
Thoughts on Benign Class~lcation in the Contert of Sex, 10 CONN. L. Ray. 813 (1978) (listing
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assembling all of the available empirical evidence documenting the negative effects
of long workdays for women. Brandeis did not himself do the research for this
brief. He relied instead upon a team headed by Josephine Goldmark.4 Goldmark's
name, unfortunately, has been lost to most legal historians. Otherwise we might
talk today about "Goldmark briefs" rather than "Brandeis briefs." 5
Most of Brandeis's (or Goldmark's) evidence would not pass as valid social
science today. At the time of Muller, however, Brandeis's brief was considered
both scholarly and revolutionary. More surprising, the Court paid attention to
Brandeis's evidence. The Court discussed the evidence approvingly and upheld the
Oregon law-even though the Court in that era struck down almost every other
example of protective labor legislation to come before it. Social science thus
played a key role in a very early case involving discrimination and the Equal
Protection Clause.
The Supreme Court's use of social science in Brown v. Board of Education6
is even more well-known. The Court in that case invoked all of the traditional legal
tools-recent precedents invalidating segregation in higher education, the history
of the Equal Protection Clause, and the text of that clause-to declare segregation
unconstitutional. In addition, however, the Court cited research by Kenneth Clark,
Mamie Clark, and others showing that segregation hampered the educational
development of minority children.7 The negative effects of segregation, the Court
declared in its opinion, are "amply supported by modem authority." 8
The Court's invocation of social science in Brown was so remarkable that it
spawned a cottage industry of commentary that has continued until this day.
Scholars have debated what the Court meant by its references to the cited research
and, indeed, whether the Court should have included social science in its opinion.9
Some scholars have maintained that the Court's references to social science
instances in which protective legislation resulted in harm to women in employment).
4 See Collins & Friesen, supra note 3, at 296-97. Goldmark was a leader in the National
Consumers' League, a group devoted to workplace reforms. Before compiling the research for
the Muller brief, Goldmark published an article in the American Journal of Sociology detaifing
the difficult conditions under which women worked. See id. at 295.
5 The combination of Goldmark's gender and her status as a non-lawyer probably kept her
name off the brief Brandeis submitted to the Supreme Court in Muller. See id. at 297. In a
subsequent case heard by the Illinois Supreme Court, however, Goldmark received credit as co-
author of a brief submitted with Brandeis. Friesen & Collins, supra note 3, at 472.
6 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
7 See id. at 494-95 n.11. For excerpts from some of the social science research, irial
testimony, and appellate statements in Brown, see MONAHAN & WALKER, supra note 2, at 150-
59.
8 Brown, 347 U.S. at 494.
9 For a bibliography of some of these writings, see MONAHAN & WALKER, supra note 2,
at 267-68.
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demeaned the moral principle embodied in the Fourteenth Amendment. What if
the social science changed? Would segregation then pass constitutional muster?10
The Court, however, tethered its Brown decision partly to social science, a fact
that suggests social science may continue to play a role in discrimination cases. 1
History alone, however, does not compel my prediction that the Supreme
Court will consult social science in weighing any post-Bakke challenge to
affirmative action in higher education. The second reason I believe that the Court
will pursue such a course is simple necessity: standing alone, neither the text nor
the history of the Equal Protection Clause answers the hard questions about what
equality means in our society. The language of the Constitution evokes a concept
of equality that is both complex and elusive. Colorblindness is an important goal
of our constitutional commitment to equality, but the Constitution establishes no
straightforward rule of race-blind action. Instead, the Fourteenth Amendment more
eloquently and ambiguously commands that "[n]o State shall... deny to any
person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." 12
The notion of "equal protection" is an open-ended one that does not derive
from constitutional text or history alone. We can only understand equality in the
context of a particular society. Each of the Supreme Court Justices, like every
member of our society, has a notion of what an equal society looks like. All of our
notions are somewhat different, but these concrete visions inform our abstract
articulation of what "equal protection" means.
I believe that the Justices who decided Brown looked at the society around
them and knew that it was not equal. The social science evidence helped them
perceive and articulate the nature of that inequality. The Justices saw that a society
in which black children identified white dolls as "nice" and black dolls as "bad"
could not be an equal society. 13 There was something wrong with that picture. It
10 Cf Edmund Cahn, Jurisprudence, 30 N.Y.U. L. REv. 150, 167 (1955) ("It is one thing
to use the current scientific findings... in order to ascertain whether the legislature has acted
reasonably" but "quite another thing to have our fundamental rights rise, faM or change along
with the latest fashions of psychological literature.").
11 Maureen Hallinan correctly notes that some lower courts have seemed less receptive to
social science evidence in recent cases challenging affirmative action programs. See Maureen
Hallinan, Diversity Effects on Student Outcomes: Social Science Evidence, 59 Omio ST. L.J. 733,
735-36 (1998). I remain optimistic, however, that social science will play some role in any
authoritative decision by the Supreme Court.
12 U.S. CONST. amend. XLV, § 1. Although the Fourteenth Amendment restricts only state
action, the Supreme Court has read the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment to impose
a similar constraint against the national government. See Boiling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 500
(1954).
13 Cf. Kenneth B. Clark & Mamie P. Clark, Racial Identification and Preference in Negro
Children, in READiNGs IN SocAL PsYcHOLoGY 169, 175 (Committee on the Teaching of Social
Psychology of The Society for the Psychological Study of Social Issues ed., 1947) (reporting on
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should not have taken much social science to see that America of the 1950s was
unequal. The stories of people who lived through that era-like Gregory
Williams-should have been enough.14 But the social science evidence was one of
many pieces enabling the Court to conclude that our society was denying equal
protection to many of its members. Forty-five years later, social science may play
a comparable role in showing the Court that we are still far from equality and that
discretion to adopt affirmative action measures can still contribute to our common
goal of achieving full equality. 15
The third reason that the Supreme Court has looked to social science evidence
in previous discrimination cases, and should weigh that evidence in any future
challenges to affirmative action, is that social science helps the Court explain to the
public its outcomes in these difficult cases. When courts decide discrimination
cases, they operate at the edges of our social tolerance. All of us suffer from bias,
but we rarely see that bias in ourselves. It is important to remember that many
upstanding people in the 1950s firmly believed that racial segregation in
elementary schools was right and proper. It is difficult for individuals to overcome
their own prejudice or even to see that it exists.
Social science is one of the tools we have for overcoming bias, for showing
people that the world is not the way they think it is. When the Supreme Court cited
social scientists in Brown, it forced readers to confront their own biases. The
Court's social science references played only a minor role in the Brown opinion,
yet those references linger in our cultural memory. It was important, I think, for
the 1954 Supreme Court to tell the public that social science had demonstrated the
harmful effects of segregation. That evidence opened the public's eyes to their own
bias, helped jar the complacency that perpetuated segregation, and strengthened
acceptance of the Court's own opinion.
In the same way, today's social science evidence illuminates the prejudice and
disadvantage that still plague our society. 16 The evidence challenges our own
the use of and results from a "Dolls Test" to investigate the development of racial identification
and preferences in black children).
14 See Gregory H. Williams, Experiencing Life on Both Sides of the Color Line: The Need
for Affirmative Action in Higher Education, 59 OHIo ST. L.J. 663 (1998).
15 C. Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 273-74 (1995) (Ginsburg, J.,
dissenting) (citing studies of ongoing racial bias as evidence that "Congress surely can conclude
that a carefully designed affirmative action program may help to realize, finally, the 'equal
protection of the laws' the Fourteenth Amendment has promised since 1868"). A majority of the
Court in Adarand adopted strict scrutiny as the test to measure the constitutionality of affirmative
action programs. That test, however, would not preclude the Court from concluding-in part
based on social science evidence-that eradicating ongoing discrimination is a compelling interest
justifying affirmative action. But see infra note 46 and accompanying text (discussing Court's
unwillingness to recognize societal discrimination as a justification for affirmative action).
16 See, e.g., WLLA G. BowEN & DEREK BoK, THE SHAPE OF THE RIVER: LONG-TERM
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complacent belief that turn-of-the-century America is a raceblind society in which
all opportunities are equal. If the Supreme Court considers social science evidence
in any future challenge to affirmative action, it might use that evidence to
demonstrate the persistent gap between our constitutional ideals and our social
reality.
Finally, social science should play a role in weighing constitutional challenges
to affirmative action because affirmative action is only a remedy. Affirmative
action is not a constitutional principle-it is just a means to achieving a
constitutional end. With remedies we must be pragmatic, we must ask what works.
We must ask about the costs of any remedies we choose-and about whether we
could design the remedy better.
Jim Chen's paper makes this point dramatically. 17 As he urges, we must
CONSEQUENCES OF CONSIDERING RACE IN COLEGE AND UNIVERSITY ADMISSIONs 144-48 (1998)
(finding that even after controlling for socioeconomic background, SAT score, college grades,
college selectivity, college major, advanced degrees, and employment sector, white men earned
$8,500 more per year, on average, than did black men); HARRY CROSs Er AL., EMPLOYER
HIRING PRAcncEs: DFRENIALTREATMENT OFHI ANIC AND ANGLO JOB SEEKERs 42 (1990)
(reporting, among other findings, that white applicants received 52% more job offers than
Hispanic applicants with equivalent credentials); MARGERY AuSTIN TURNER Er AL.,
OPtORTUNrrIE DENIED, OPPORTUNmES DIMINISHED: RACIAL DISCRIMINATION IN HIRING at xi
(1991) (stating that on average, white applicants advanced further in job application process, and
received more final offers, than did black applicants with matched credentials); MARGERY
AusmiN TURNER ET AL, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOUSING AND URBAN DEVELOPMENT, HOUSING
DISCRIMINATION STUDY: SYNTHESIs at i-vii (1991) (describing a study of housing searches in
twenty-five metropolitan areas where more than half of African-American or Hispanic testers
seeking to rent or buy housing experienced unfavorable treatment compared to matched white
testers); Peter J. Leahy, Are Racial Factors Important for the Allocation of Mortgage Money?,
44 AM. J. ECON. & Soc. 185 (1985) (stating that mortgage lending outcomes appear racially
biased even after controlling for socioeconomic factors and other neighborhood characteristics);
Ian Ayres, Fair Driving: Gender and Race Discrimination in Retail Car Negotiations, 104 HARV.
L. REv. 817, 818-819 (1991) (noting that black and white consumers pursuing identical
negotiation strategies and presenting identical credit histories obtained dramatically different
prices for new cars; the final price for black male testers was twice as high as that for white male
testers, while final offers for black female testers were three times higher than those made to
white males). See generally BARBARA F. RESKIN, THE REAurEs OF AFFIRMATIVE ACrION IN
EMPLoYX ENT 19-43 (1998) (summarizing these and other studies); GEORGE STEPHANOPOULOS
& CHRISTOPHER EDLEY, JR., AFFIRMATIvE ACTION REVIEW: REPORT TO THE PRESIDENt §§ 4.1-
4.3 (1995) (summarizing the results of paired testing in which blacks and Latinos were "treated
significantly worse than equally qualified whites," as well as other evidence of ongoing
discrimination).
17 See Jim Chen, Diversity in a Dfferent Dimension: Evolutionary Theory and Affirmative
Action's Destiny, 59 Omo ST. L.J. 811, 898-902, 906-908 (1998) (arguing that educational
diversity based on Bakke may inflict irrevocable harm on the very idea of the American
University and that educational affirmative action has not only led to a misallocation of scarce
resources but has also obscured other worthy causes by diverting political energy and material
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continue to ask about the costs of affirmative action and whether the benefits justify
those costs. Even when we conclude that the benefits outweigh the costs, we must
still ask if there are ways to make affirmative action better. The Supreme Court's
current commitment to strict scrutiny, with its requirement of "narrowly tailored"
means,18 insures that approach. At the same time, we should not allow the costs
of affirmative action programs to blind us to the benefits of those programs;
substantial costs are bearable if they produce even more significant benefits.
Weighing costs and benefits is an essential step in designing any remedy. Social
science data can show us both the pluses and minuses of any affirmative action
program.
If the Supreme Court does look to social science when judging the
constitutionality of affirmative action in higher education, what evidence should
the Court consider? Ideally, the Court would consider projections like those
offered by Thomas Kane, John Gruhl, Susan Welch, and Edgar Epps. On the one
hand, these researchers have shown that the impact of affirmative action on higher
education is modest. Affirmative action affects student admissions at elite
institutions, but not at the overwhelming majority of universities nationwide. 19
Even at elite schools, the number of students admitted through affirmative action
programs remains small, 20 while trends in minority enrollments depend as much
on economic conditions as on affirmative action initiatives.21 Affirmative action
programs neither deny white students an education nor exclude them from the
most prestigious schools. Indeed, because of overall growth in higher education,
the number of white students at professional schools and selective colleges has
increased substantially during the last thirty years-despite the implementation of
affirmative action programs during those same decades. 22
resources).
18 See Adarand, 515 U.S. at 235.
19 See Thomas J. Kane, Racial and Ethnic Preferences in College Admissions, in Tim
BLACK-Wr TFSr SCORE GAP 431,438 (Christopher Jencks & Meredith Phillips eds., 1998),
reprinted in 59 Omo ST. L.J. 971, 978 (1998).
20 Cf id. at 453, reprinted in 59 Omo ST. L.J. 971, 993 (noting that only 15% of Harvard
College students are African American or Hispanic, and that some of these would have been
admitted absent affirmative action); Edgar Epps, Affirmative Action and Minority Access to
Faculty Positions, 59 Oilo ST. L.J. 755, 762 (1998) (reporting that in fall 1995, only 6.8% of
graduate students nationwide were African American, 3.9% were Hispanic, 4.4% were
Asian/Pacific Islander, and 0.5% were Native American).
21 See Susan Welch & John Gruhl, Does Bakke Matter? Afflrnative Action and Minority
Enrollments in Medical and Law Schools, 59 OoIo ST. L.J. 697, 710 (1998) (reporting that in
the early to mid-1990s an economic boom made it possible for more minority students to attend
college).
22 The enrollment of J.D. students nationwide, for example, rose from 46,666 in 1963-1964
to 113,080 in 1977-1978; 117,997 in 1987-1988; and 128,623 in 1996-1997. See AMERICAN
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While affirmative action programs thus impose few costs on white
applicants, 23 they dramatically affect the number of minority students enrolled at
BAR ASSOCIATION, APPROVED LAw SCHOOLS: 1998 EDrION, at 451 (1997). Total enrollment
of minority students (including African Americans, Native Americans, Asian Americans, and
all categories of Hispanic Americans) was 9,580 in 1977-1978, the first year such statistics are
available; 13,250 in 1987-1988; and 25,279 in 1996-1997. See AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION,
A REviEw OF LEGAL EDUCATION IN THE UNrTED STATES: FALL 1992, at 70 (1993) (reporting
1977-1978 figures); APPROVED LAW SCHOOLS, supra, at 453 (reporting 1987-1988 and 1996-
1997 figures). The number of white students pursuing a legal education, therefore, ballooned
from about 46,000 in 1963-1964 (when minority enrollments were low, but precise figures are
unavailable) to 103,500 in 1977-1978, after the establishment of affirmative action programs.
White enrollments remained at the latter high level throughout the next two decades, despite an
increasing number of minority students (at least some of whom would have been admitted without
any affirmative action programs). Based on the above data, there were 104,747 white J.D.
students in 1987-1988 and 103,344 in 1996-1997.
See also UNrrED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE, BUREAU OF THE CENSUS,
STATISTICAL ABSTRACr OF THE UNITED STATES 194 (1997) (number of medical degrees conferred
nationwide rose from 7,032 in 1960 to 12,447 in 1975; 15,075 in 1990; and 15,368 in 1994);
Regents of the University of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 272, 275 (1978) (when the University
of California at Davis's medical school adopted a special program to admit 16 minority students
annually, it also doubled class size from 50 to 100 students; thus, more white students enrolled
at the medical school after adoption of the affirmative action program than before).
Enrollment information limited to selective colleges is more difficult to obtain. White
enrollment at all undergraduate institutions certainly has risen substantially during recent decades,
both in absolute numbers and as a percentage of white high school graduates. See UNIED STATES
DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, NATIONAL CENTER FOR EDUCATION STATISTICS, DIGESr OF
EDUCATION STATsTCS 215 (1997) (number of non-Hispanic white undergraduates rose from
7,740,500 in 1976 to 8,480,700 in 1980; and 8,805,600 in 1995); CHARMs J. ANDERSON, FACr
BOOK ON HIGHER EDUCATION: 1997 EDITION, at 19 (1998) (percentage of white high school
graduates attending college rose from 45.8% in 1960 to 52.0% in 1970, 59.4% in 1985, and
62.6% in 1995). At least one study, moreover, points to modest recent increases in enrollments
at the most selective colleges. See BowEN & BOK, supra note 16, at 293 (entering class size for
undergraduates at thirteen of the most selective private universities grew from 15,849 in 1976 to
17,494 in 1989).
23 William Bowen and Derek Bok have calculated that eliminating affirmative action
preferences for African-American applicants at the nation's most selective colleges would raise
each white applicant's chance of admission by no more than one and one half percent. See
BOWEN & BOK, supra note 16, at 36. This apparent paradox, that affirmative action programs
greatly increase the enrollment of minority students while having little impact on each white
applicant's chance of admission, derives from the fact that white applicants greatly outnumber
both minority applicants and the number places awarded through affirmative action
considerations. Thomas Kane likens the effect to the impact of reserved parking spaces for
handicapped drivers: Every driver in a crowded parking lot will look covetously at an open
handicapped space, thinking that he or she could park if only the space was not reserved.
Eliminating handicapped spaces, however, would have a minor impact on nondisabled drivers
because the latter drivers vastly outnumber disabled ones. See Kane, spra note 19, at 453,
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selective schools. Kane, Gruhl, and Welch offer compelling evidence that a halt
in affirmative action programs would virtually exclude African-American and
Hispanic students from some elite institutions. Welch and Gmhl report precipitous
declines in the number of minority students admitted to the flagship law schools
at the University of California and the University of Texas following the
termination of affirmative action programs in those states. 24 Kane, meanwhile,
shows that substituting consideration of economic class for race would do little to
maintain the percentage of minority students currently attending the most elite
institutions.25 These findings eloquently pose the question whether the perceived
benefits of opening every seat in higher education to colorblind competition
outweighs the costs of resegregation in the most elite schools. 26
A court weighing the constitutionality of affirmative action in university
admissions would also consider evidence of the educational benefits stemming
from those programs. Maureen Hallinan has carefully summarized research
documenting those positive effects. A large number of studies show that minority
students achieve higher test scores when they attend integrated elementary and
secondary schools with a white majority.2 7 These gains come at no cost to the
white students attending those schools.28 Fewer studies exist of college and
university achievement, but they point in the same direction. In particular, one
recent study of undergraduate and graduate students finds that ethnically diverse
problem-solving groups produce more feasible and effective solutions than do
groups composed exclusively of white students.2 9 Additionally, a significant
number of studies have found that racially diverse campuses increase student
tolerance of different racial groups, reduce prejudice, and enhance cordial
reprinted in 59 Oi-o ST. L.J. 971, 992 (1998).
24 See Welch & Gruhl, supra note 21. The number of minority students attending those
institutions dropped even more dramatically. Only four African Americans and twenty-six
Mexican Americans entered the University of Texas's law school in 1997, while just one African
American (who had deferred admission from a previous year) started Berkeley's law program
in 1997. See Janet Elliott, Hopwood Appea! Focuses on Future Without Racial Preferences, TEx.
LAW., May 25, 1998, at 8; John E. Morris, Boalt Hall's Affirmative Action Dilemma, AM.
LAW., Nov. 1997, at 4.
25 See Kane, supra note 19, at 448, reprinted in 59 Omo ST. L.J. 971, 988 (1998).
26 Faced with this bleak prospect, a few long-time foes of affirmative action have altered
their stance. See, e.g., Nathan Glazer, In Defense of Preference, NEw REPUBuC, Apr. 6, 1998,
at 18; Glenn Loury, An American Tragedy: The Legacy of Slavery Lingers in Our Cities'
Ghettos, BROOKINGS REV., Mar. 1998, at 38.
27 See Hallinan, supra note 11, at 742.
28 See id.
2 9 See Poppy Lauretta McLeod et al., Ethnic Diversity and Creativity in Small Groups, 27
SMALL GRouP RESEARca 248 (1996).
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relationships among students of different races. 30
The Court might also consider the evidence offered by Jennifer Hochschild
and Thomas Kane that affirmative action in university admissions has harmed
neither the universities nor the intended beneficiaries of those programs. Although
elite universities engage in the most extensive affirmative action programs, both
tuition and application rates have risen disproportionately at those schools. 31
Market response suggests that these universities have gained, rather than lost,
prestige during the era of affirmative action. Contrary to some predictions,
minority students who attend those elite institutions reap the same benefits as their
white classmates. For both minority and white students, attending a more selective
college is associated with higher graduation rates and greater earning power.32
Indeed, African-American students who attend selective colleges through
affirmative action programs are more likely to graduate from college, obtain
advanced degrees, and secure high earnings than are African Americans with
similar SAT scores who attend less selective institutions. 33 Thus, minority students
capitalize on the opportunities affirmative action programs offer them.
The same minority students use their training to benefit the community. A
longitudinal study found that African-American graduates of selective colleges
were more likely than their white classmates to engage in civic activities after
graduation, participate in politics, and assume leadership roles in both of these
spheres. 34 Affirmative action thus furthers the traditional role of elite educational
institutions in producing community servants and public leaders.
If the Court revisits the balance struck in Bakke, finally, it might ponder
Hochschild's evidence that most Americans eschew the extreme positions
advocated by the most vocal opponents and supporters of affirmative action.35 In
this context, the political process is likely to produce intermediate, compromise
answers to the affirmative action debate. Only the Court itself might impede this
process by endorsing an extreme position outlawing all forms of race-conscious
affirmative action. 36
If the Court heeds all of this research, I think it will adhere to the principles
of Justice Powell's opinion in Bakke. As Samuel Issacharoff and Kathleen Sullivan
point out, Powell's opinion was a compromise. 37 It was, however, a pragmatic
30 See Halinan, supra note 11, at 745; see also BowEN & BOK, supra note 16, at 218-55.
31 See Jennifer Hochschild, The Strange Career of Affirmative Action, 59 Omo ST. L.J.
997, 1003 (1998).
32 See Kane, supra note 19, at 445, reprinted in 59 OHio ST. L.J. 971, 985 (1998).
33 See BowEN & BOK, supra note 16, at 258-65.
34 See id. at 155-74.
35 See Hochschild, supra note 31, at 1000.
36 See id.
37 See Samuel Issacharoff, Can Affirmative Action Be Defended?, 59 OmIo ST. L.J. 669
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compromise, one that produced a society better fitting our picture of an equal
society than does a world with no race-conscious decisionmaking in university
admissions. As Issacharoff warns, abandoning the Bakke compromise would
curtail the ability of public universities to meet their twin functions of advancing
academic excellence and securing public access. 38 And as Sullivan cogently
argues, ending race-conscious admissions policies most likely would produce less
efficient subterfuges for those policies. 39 The Bakke compromise remains essential
to public university education at this time. Confronting the social science evidence
in this symposium and elsewhere should lead the Court to sustain that compromise.
If the Court really listens to the social science evidence, however, it should
take a step beyond Bakke. As Issacharoff, Gruhl, and Welch argue, the diversity
rationale embraced by Justice Powell in Bakke does not fit the realities of
university admissions very well.40 Certainly there is virtue in diversity-in the
face-to-face interaction of people from different backgrounds that Rachel Moran
eloquently describes and in the educational gains Maureen Hallinan has
detailed 4 1-but the diversity rationale does not fully account for the way we
conduct affirmative action in university admissions.
In addition to promoting diversity as a means of enhancing education,-
affirmative action in university admissions addresses the societal discrimination
poignantly recounted by Gregory Williams. 42 A wide body of social science
research painfully documents that discrimination, as do the stories of individual
minority Americans.43 As Vincene Verdun recounts, blackness is a difference that
African Americans carry with them every day. 44 Other nonwhites suffer similar
burdens. The minority groups targeted by affirmative action programs, moreover,
possess substantially lower socioeconomic capital than do other ethnic groups. As
Deborah Malamud explains, this legacy of historical discrimination significantly
disadvantages blacks and some other minority groups.45 The sum of this societal
discrimination, both historical and contemporary, precludes the possibility of a
level playing field for minority citizens. Affirmative action in university admissions
is not the only answer to this societal discrimination, but it is an essential one.
(1998); Kathleen M. Sullivan, AfterAffinmative Action, 59 Omo ST. L.J. 1039, 1039-40 (1998).
38 See Issachatoff, supra note 37, at 684.
39 See Sullivan, supra note 37.
40 See Issacharoff, supra note 37, at 676; Welch & Gruhl, supra note 21.
41 See Rachel F. Moran, Diversity, Distance, and the Delivery of Higher Education, 59
OHO ST. L.J. 775 (1998); Hallinan, supra note 11.
4 2 See Williams, supra note 14.
43 See supra note 16.
44 See Vincene Verdun, The Only Lonely Remedy, 59 Omo ST. L.J. 793 (1998).
45 See Deborah C. Malamud, The Jew Taboo: Jewish Difference and the Affirmative
Action Debate, 59 OHIo ST. L.J. 915 (1998).
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These programs both compensate minority applicants for the bias that has reduced
their educational opportunities and create a middle class of minority citizens that
will help overcome future discrimination.
Yet remedying societal discrimination is the one justification for affirmative
action that the Supreme Court has been reluctant to accept. State and local
governments, the Court has said, cannot remedy societal discrimination.46 Like
most contributors to this volume, I find this position puzzling. If the government
cannot remedy societal discrimination, then who can?
We have always used our government to remedy social problems, at least
when the problems were those of the white majority. To take just one example,
during the 1930s white Americans faced a profound crisis in their opportunities.
The Depression left untold numbers of white citizens unemployed. Our
government responded with a program of public handouts that has never been
matched, training programs to enhance the future of unemployed citizens, and
legislation to strengthen the power of ordinary workers. The Supreme Court
upheld those programs even though it had to overrule entrenched constitutional
rules to do so. Indeed, the New Deal provoked a constitutional crisis so grave that
one scholar has characterized it as a "fundamental reworking of constitutional
identity." 47 Yet the Court upheld this governmental effort to remedy a grave social
problem.
When we talk about the New Deal, we often forget that New Deal programs
disproportionately benefited white Americans. During its early years, the Works
Progress Administration paid white workers higher wages than it paid black
workers for the same jobs.48 The National Recovery Act operated in the same
46 See City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 496-97 (1989) (plurality
opinion); Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 274-76 (1986); Regents of the Univ.
of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 309-10 (1978) (opinion of Powell, J., announcing the judgment
of the Court). The Court has left open the possibility that Congress may possess greater power
than the states to remedy societal discrimination, partly because Section 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment explicitly authorizes Congress to "enforce, by appropriate legislation" the equal
protection guarantee. U.S. CoNsr. amend. XIV, § 5. See Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena,
515 U.S. 200, 230-31 (1995); J.A. Croson, 488 U.S. at 488-90.
Curiously, the Court has not been as reluctant to consider societal discrimination when
reviewing affirmative action remedies for women. In Califano v. Webster, 430 U.S. 313 (1977),
decided only a year before Bakke, the Court approved preferential treatment for women workers
in calculating social security benefits. In reaching this result, the Court referred repeatedly to the
need "to remedy discrimination against women in the job market" and to "compensate for
particular economic disabilities suffered by women." Id. at 319-20. See also Ruth Bader
Ginsburg & Deborah Jones Merritt, Affirmative Action: An International Human Rights Dialogue
59 REc. B. Ass'N CrY N.Y. (forthcoming 1999) (Cardozo Lecture).
4 7 BRUCE ACKERMAN, 2 WE THE PEOPLE: TRANSFORMATIONS 8 (1998).
41 See DORS KEARNS GOODWIN, No ORDINARYTIE 162-63 (1994).
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manner, 49 while the Agricultural Adjustment Act eliminated the crops of black
farmers before those of whites.50 Nobody was coy about this in the 1930s-the
discrimination was quite overt. In 1935, Roosevelt signed an executive order
barring discrimination in WPA projects, and the situation for black Americans
improved somewhat. 51 But black Americans never benefited from the New Deal
in the way that white Americans did.
More fundamentally, the New Deal shows us that when white Americans face
a crisis in their economic opportunities, the government will respond. Our
government will act affirmatively and the courts, despite a major constitutional
crisis, will uphold that action. The same is still true today. If white Americans
faced the type of educational and employment handicaps that minorities have faced
throughout our history, I am confident that our government would act. 52
The Supreme Court's reluctance to countenance affirmative action as a means
of redressing societal discrimination suggests that a majority of Justices do not fully
grasp the extent of that discrimination. If the Court truly understood the extent of
racial discrimination that still infects our society, I do not think that it could
continue to reject affirmative action as a remedy for that bias. Doing so would
suggest that we can deny social responsibility for our collective flaws and shift
responsibility for bias to the victims of that discrimination. Surely the Court does
not intend that result.
The ongoing task for lawyers and social scientists, therefore, is to document
the extent of societal discrimination that persists in the United States today, to show
how affirmative action programs can help overcome that bias, and to detail any
49 See id. at 162; ARTmuM. ScHLESINGER, JR., 3 THE AGE OF ROOsEvELT: THE POLITICS
oF UPHEAvAL 431 (1960).
50 See GooDwiN, supra note 48, at 162; SCHLESINGER, supra note 49, at 431. See generally
HARvARD SrrKOFF, 1 A NEW DEAL FOR BLACKS: Tim EMERGENCE OF CIVIL RIGHTs AS A
NATIONAL IsSUE 52-54 (1978).
51 See GOODWIN, supra note 48, at 163; SrKoFF, supra note 50, at 69-74. Roosevelt also
issued an order, covering both government agencies and defense contractors, that was a precursor
of modem affirmative action programs in government contracting. See James E. Jones, Jr.,
Twenty-One Years of Affirmative Action: The Maturation of the Administration Enforcement
Process Under the Executive Order 11,246 as Amended, 59 CI.-KENT L. REv. 67, 70-71
(1982).
52 The United Nations has calculated that white Americans, when considered as a separate
nation, rank first in the world in well-being (a measure that combines life expectancy, educational
achievement, and income). See UNrrD NATIONS, HUMAN DEvELOPMENr REPORT 1995, at 22
(1995). African Americans rank a depressing twenty-seventh worldwide, while Hispanic
Americans rank even lower at thirty-second. See id. Surely if the well-being of white Americans
sank from first to twenty-seventh worldwide, the government would contemplate drastic remedial
steps. See also supra note 46 (noting the Supreme Court's willingness to accept societal
discrimination as ajustification for affirmative action programs benefiting women).
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costs of those programs. Armed with this information, government agencies-
including public universities-can tailor programs that will open doors to those
who suffer from discrimination without unduly disadvantaging the more privileged
members of society. This Symposium begins that essential task.

